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a b s t r a c t
What events do employees recall or anticipate when they think of past or future unfair treatment at
work? We propose that an employee’s temporal perspective can change the salience of different types
of injustice through its effect on cognitions about employment. Study 1 used a survey in which employee
temporal focus was measured as an individual difference. Whereas greater levels of future focus related
positively to concerns about distributive injustice, greater levels of present focus related positively to
concerns about interactional injustice. In Study 2, an experimental design focused employee attention
on timeframes that differed in temporal orientation and temporal distance. Whereas distributive injus-
tice was more salient when future (versus past) orientation was induced, interactional injustice was more
salient when past orientation was induced and at less temporal distance. Study 3 showed that the mech-
anism underlying the effect of employee temporal perspective is abstract versus concrete cognitions
about employment.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
An important source ofmotivation atwork iswhether employees
feel they are fairly treated. However, the nature and target of reac-
tions toworkplaceunfairness candependonwhether the unfairness
experienced primarily relates to outcomes (distributive justice),
processes and procedures (procedural justice), or explanations and
the quality of interpersonal treatment (interactional justice)
(Cohen-Charash & Spector, 2001; Colquitt, 2001; Colquitt, Wesson,
Porter, Conlon, & Ng, 2001; Conlon, Meyer, & Nowakowski, 2005;
Masterson, Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000). Although a single event
can involve multiple justice dimensions, due to limited attentional
resources employees often focus on and react to speciﬁc types of
injustice at the expense of others (Lind, 2001; Skitka, 2003). Thus,
an important question becomes: what type of (in)justice gets the
attention of employees and when?
We propose that the unjust events employees bring to mind can
depend on the temporal perspective taken: whether an individual
focuses on the past or the future (temporal orientation), and on
events that are near or distant in time (temporal distance). Consider
the situation of an employee who experiences an unfair outcome
(such as unpaid overtime hours) as well as unfair interpersonal
treatment (such as being yelled at in front of co-workers). Which
event will he or she be more likely to remember, and which event
will be of concern in the future?
We explore in three studies the effect of temporal perspective
on the salience of different types of unjust events. In Study 1, we
relate individual differences in temporal focus to concerns about
workplace injustice using a survey methodology. In Study 2, we re-
late experimentally manipulated temporal perspective to the types
of unfair events recalled and anticipated at work. Finally, in Study
3, we explore the mechanism behind the effects of temporal per-
spective by experimentally manipulating cognitions about
employment.
Temporal perspectives
The temporal perspective taken by individuals can be inﬂu-
enced by context and by individual differences. Some situations
can direct employee attention to speciﬁc timeframes, such as when
employees are asked to evaluate the past year at work, while in
other situations a temporal perspective is implicit. For example,
if an employee evaluates his or her organization or supervisor,
the entire history of the relationship may be examined (Hollensbe,
Khazanchi, & Masterson, 2008). Conversely, fairness evaluations
relating to a speciﬁc project, teamwork experience, or temporary
appointment are likely to focus on a speciﬁc, bounded period of
time. Temporal perspective can also result from an individual’s
predisposition to, for example, focus on the future more than on
the present or the past (Hofstede, 2001; McGrath & Tschan,
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2004; Shipp, Edwards, & Schurer Lambert, 2009; Zimbardo & Boyd,
1999). In this research we consider the effects of temporal perspec-
tive both as a measurable trait difference and as a contextual factor
that can be manipulated.
Little is known about the effects of temporal perspectives on
work-related phenomena. However, research in other areas com-
paring how individuals recall the past versus anticipate the future
has led to interesting ﬁndings. For example, aspects of experiences
that are important in anticipation may no longer matter as much
when experiences are considered in retrospect (Kahneman, 2000;
Reyna & Brainerd, 1995). Events recalled are also different from
events anticipated in terms of the sensorial, contextual and emo-
tional detail (Anderson & Dewhurst, 2009; D’Argembeau and Van
der Linden, 2004). Features of experiences that determine inter-
temporal choices over a short time span are not the same features
that are important over larger time spans (Frederick, Loewenstein,
& O’Donoghue, 2002). Finally gains and losses are valued differ-
ently in retrospect versus in anticipation, and moral judgment is
harsher for future as opposed to past transgressions (Caruso,
2010; Caruso, Gilbert, & Wilson, 2008; Eyal, Liberman, & Trope,
2008). Thus, temporal perspectives can affect how experiences
are perceived and evaluated.
Although the effects of temporal perspective on organizational
justice perceptions have not been examined, several streams of re-
search propose important justice phenomena that relate to the
objective passage of time. For example, the temporal order in
which justice facets, such as procedural or distributive justice,
are experienced can inﬂuence their relative potency (Lind, 2001;
Van den Bos, 2001). Similarly, procedural (versus distributive) jus-
tice becomes less important long after an event, when the outcome
can be better understood and evaluated, than directly preceding or
directly following an event, when the fairness of the outcome
might still be uncertain (Ambrose & Cropanzano, 2003). Also, neg-
ative work-related attitudes and behaviors can result from
employees anticipating future injustice (Shapiro & Kirkman,
2001). Though important, the above temporal effects differ in sev-
eral respects from our focus on the effects of temporal perspective.
First, most studies that elicit perceptions of an unfair event do
not examine whether the organizational actor would have thought
of the event had he/she not been prompted to do so. It is thus
important to also consider how time affects the salience of events,
in terms of whether they are spontaneously brought to mind. Sec-
ond, when justice events at time 1 are shown to lead to fairness
perceptions and outcomes at time 2, little attention is generally
paid to the duration of the intervening time, i.e., smaller versus
greater temporal distance. Third, while the effect of temporal ori-
entation is implicit in some areas of research such as anticipatory
injustice (Kirkman, Shapiro, Novelli, & Brett, 1996), factors affect-
ing retrospective versus anticipatory judgments of organizational
justice remain largely unexplored.
Temporal perspective and employee concerns about injustice
Examining the experience of work at a temporal distance makes
that experience psychologically distant. Psychological distance
occurs when an experience is in some way not part of one’s direct
and immediate perception and feelings (Trope, Liberman, &
Wakslak, 2007). For example, experiences become more psycho-
logically distant when they occur farther away geographically,
when they happen to somebody else versus oneself, and when they
are less versus more likely to occur (Liberman & Trope, 2008).
Construal level theory (CLT) (Trope & Liberman, 2003) suggests
that psychological distance affects how an experience is mentally
represented. In general, more psychologically distant experiences
are represented at a higher (versus lower) level of construal,
deﬁned as:
‘‘High-level construals are relatively simple, decontextualized
representations that extract the gist from the available informa-
tion. These construals consist of general, superordinate, and
essential features of actions. . . . Low-level construals tend to
be more concrete and include subordinate, contextual, inciden-
tal, ‘‘how’’ features of events. Changes in these features produce
relatively minor changes in the meaning of the event. Low-level
construals are thus richer and more detailed but less structured
and parsimonious than high-level construals.’’ (Trope & Liber-
man, 2003, p. 405)
Thus,when the experience ofwork is examined at a temporal dis-
tance it should be represented at a higher level of construal. The
greater the temporal distance, the more schematic is that represen-
tation, involving deﬁnitional aspects of work primarily, and little, if
any, idiosyncratic detail. Although construal level theory has tended
to focuson theeffects of temporal distance, temporalorientation can
similarly affect the representation of an experience. Future experi-
ences that are hypothetical and uncertain are more psychologically
distant and thereforewill be representedat a higher level of constru-
al than experiences in the past or present (Liberman, Trope, &
Stephan, 2007; Todorov, Goren, & Trope, 2007; Wakslak, Trope,
Liberman, & Aloni, 2006). In this research, we propose that psycho-
logical distance resulting fromboth temporal distance and temporal
orientation will have important effects on justice reasoning.
We use construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope &
Liberman, 2003) to argue that temporal perspective can affect
whether employees focus on the forest (general, deﬁnitional
features) or the trees (speciﬁc, contextualized events) of their
employment relationship. This, in turn, can affect whether employ-
ees are more likely to ‘‘see’’ unfair events that violate general and
deﬁnitional aspects of the employment relationship versus other
types of unfair events.
Day-to-day experiences at work can fulﬁl a variety of material,
social, and esteem goals. Therefore, when employees construe their
employment relationship at a low or contextualized level, they pay
attention not only to general features of employment but also to
speciﬁc details, peripheral goals, contextual peculiarities, and so-
cial relationships. In contrast, when employees construe their
employment relationship at a high level, their cognitions become
more simplistic, and hold the minimum content necessary (that
people typically agree on) to distinguish employment from other
social situations.
A distinctive aspect of the employment relationship is that
employees perform work as directed by the organization and in
return receive recognition, material rewards, and career opportuni-
ties. This aspect of work is therefore likely to feature prominently
in high level construals of employment. Such an ‘‘economic’’ focus
is present in both transactional and relational psychological
contracts, although relational contracts have an additional
socioemotional aspect (Rousseau, 1990). Indeed the association
between employment and monetary gain is learned in early child-
hood before individuals develop richer representations of work,
and adults often deﬁne work as a means of earning a living (Chaves
et al., 2004). Rousseau (2001) argues that at higher levels of
abstraction, employment is often conceived of in terms of the
clauses of labor contracts, which generally focus on material rather
than socioemotional outcomes. In contrast, because respectful
treatment is expected both at work and in other social situations,
it is less deﬁnitional of work and less likely to feature in high level
construals of employment. This is not to say that socioemotional
aspects of work are not important, only that they do not ﬁgure
as prominently when work is represented at a higher level of
construal.
For the above reasons, we expect distributive and interactional
dimensions of justice to be differentially salient when employment
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is construed at high (abstract) versus low (contextualized) levels.
For example, whereas unpaid overtime (an example of distributive
injustice)would violate a deﬁnitional aspect of employment, receiv-
ing impolite feedback (interactional injustice) would violate a non-
deﬁnitional aspect of employment. In contrast, procedural injustice
can involve violations to aspects of employment that are both high
and low level. On the one hand, because speciﬁc procedures can de-
scribe the ‘‘how’’ aspects of outcome allocations, they can be seen as
belonging to lower levelmental representations of employment. On
the other hand, procedural criteria, such as consistency or the ab-
sence of bias (for example, in age, sex, or race), are sufﬁciently uni-
versal to be included in high level mental representations of the
employment relationship. Therefore, we do not propose or test rela-
tionships between temporal perspective, abstractness of employee
cognitions about employment, and procedural justice concerns.
Rather, we focus on the relationship between temporal perspective
and the salience of (a) distributive injustice (violating deﬁnitional
aspects of the employment relationship), and (b) interactional
injustice (violating non-deﬁnitional aspects).
In Study 1, we hypothesize that distributive injustice is more
salient to more future-oriented individuals, and that interactional
injustice is more salient to more present oriented individuals. In
Study 2, we predict that distributive versus interactional injustice
will be more salient when future (versus past) and more distant
(versus more proximal) temporal horizons are considered. In Study
3, we hold temporal perspective constant and show that manipu-
lating cognitions about employment (abstract versus concrete) af-
fects the salience of distributive versus interactional injustice.c
Study 1
In Study 1, we examine the relationship between employee
concerns about injustice and individual differences in temporal fo-
cus, ‘‘the attention individuals devote to thinking about the past,
present, and future’’ (Shipp et al., 2009, p. 1). Shipp and colleagues
(2009) showed that individual differences in temporal focus can
help explain how attitudes, cognitions and behaviors become af-
fected by past experiences, current circumstances, and future
expectations. Zimbardo and Boyd (1999) argued similarly that
the temporal focus of individuals affects their readiness to plan
for the future as opposed to caring only about the ‘‘here and
now’’. We propose that individual differences in temporal focus,
in terms of level of future focus and present focus, can also help
predict the type of injustice that employees are concerned about
in work settings.
Individuals with higher levels of future focus report thinking
about future situations and eventsmore often. Therefore, we expect
more future-oriented individuals to focus more on higher level,
deﬁnitional features of experiences, including employment, and less
on lower level, contextualized features (Liberman, Sagristano, &
Trope, 2002; Reyna & Brainerd, 1995; Robinson & Clore, 2002a,
2002b; Trope & Liberman, 2003). Distributive injustice violates a
higher level, deﬁnitional aspect of employment. Because a focus on
higher level aspects allows people to transcend ‘‘the here and
now’’ (Liberman&Trope, 2008),we expect employeeswho aremore
focused on future events to have greater concerns about distributive
injustice than is the case for employees less focusedon futureevents.
Hypothesis 1. Greater levels of future orientation in individual
temporal focus will relate positively to the proportion of justice
concerns that have to do with distributive injustice.
In contrast, greater (versus lower) levels of present focus are ex-
pected to increase the attention paid to the speciﬁc, contextual de-
tails of workplace events (Trope & Liberman, 2003). Speciﬁcally, we
expect more present-oriented individuals to pay greater attention
to how decisions affecting them were explained, and how they
were treated interpersonally.
Hypothesis 2. Greater levels of present temporal orientation in
individual temporal focus will relate positively to the proportion of
justice concerns that have to do with interactional injustice.
No speciﬁc hypotheses are proposed regarding the effects of
greater levels of past focus. Whereas effects similar to greater lev-
els of present focus would be expected for individuals focusing on
the recent past (relatively low on psychological distance), effects
similar to greater levels of future focus would be expected for indi-




Five hundred and ﬁfty-two US-based full-time employees with
at least two years of work experience were recruited online
through CT Marketing Group, Inc.1 Fifty-eight respondents (11% of
the sample) were excluded from the analysis because they did not
pass the attention check in the form of a trap question. The ﬁnal
sample was 47% male, with average age of 44. Eighty-one percent
had a junior college degree at a minimum, including 16% who com-
pleted graduate studies. The majority of participants were Caucasian
(82%). Asian Americans, African Americans, and Hispanics consti-
tuted 7.1%, 4.5% and 4.3% of the sample respectively. Average work
experience was 21 years. A variety of occupations was represented,
the most frequent being management (14%), ofﬁce and administra-
tive support (12%), computer and mathematical (11%), business
and ﬁnancial operations (9%), sales (7%), and healthcare (6%).
Predictor and criteria measures
Present and future temporal orientation. Present temporal orienta-
tion was measured using the 4-item present focus subscale from
the 12-item temporal focus scale (TFS) (Shipp et al., 2009). Items
include ‘‘I focus on what is currently happening in my life’’
(a = .86). Future temporal orientation was measured using the 4-
item future focus subscale from the TFS. Items include ‘‘I think
about times to come’’ (a = .93). Respondents indicated how often
they engaged in thinking about the present and the future using
1 (Never) to 7 (Constantly).
Concerns about injustice. Respondents were asked the following:
‘‘Please, think about work-related unfair events. What type of un-
fair event at work is of concern to you? Take a moment or two
to think of an event. Let us know what kind of event it is, what
would happen, what makes it unfair? In the space below, describe
the unfair event you have in mind.’’
Control variables
Perceptions of organizational justice. Because employees who
experience high levels of organizational justice may be less likely
to report an unfair event, perceptions of overall organizational
justice were measured using three items from Ambrose and
Schminke’s (2009) scale, including ‘‘Overall, I am treated fairly by
my organization’’ (a = .96).
Past temporal orientation. Past temporal orientation was
measured to ensure completeness of our treatment of individual
differences in temporal focus. The 4-item past focus subscale from
the TFS (Shipp et al., 2009) was used, including ‘‘I replay memories
of the past in my mind’’ (a = .91).
1 CT Marketing Group works with various panel management companies that
provide a mix of study-speciﬁc and other incentives (PayPal, cash, gift certiﬁcates and
products) to survey respondents in exchange for panel membership.
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Demographics. Age, years of work experience, organizational po-
sition (management versus not), and gender were measured via
self report.
Results
Descriptive statistics, Cronbach alphas, and correlations are pre-
sented in Table 1. As in the original validation studies (Shipp et al.,
2009), the future, present, and past dimensions of the TFS were
found to be interdependent. To conﬁrm the hypothesized three-
dimensional structure of the measure, conﬁrmatory factor analyses
(CFAs) were conducted. In order to minimize the occurrence of
Type I and Type II errors, Hu and Bentler (1999) suggest the use
of either the SRMR index (reasonable ﬁt <.08) or the RMSEA index
(reasonable ﬁt <.06). The three factor model best ﬁt the data
(CFI = .99, SRMR = .059, RMSEA = .049), with all indicator loadings
signiﬁcant and above .40. A one factor model in which past, pres-
ent, and future orientations all loaded on a single factor, did not
ﬁt the data well (CFI = .86, SRMR = .20, RMSEA = .21).
Unfair events described by survey respondents were coded by
the ﬁrst author and an undergraduate research assistant, using
established organizational justice scales and deﬁnitions of justice
facets (Bies, 2001; Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal,
1976). The research assistant received 4 h of training in identifying
types of unjust events as part of a research assistantship workshop
taught to a team of four individuals. After being taught deﬁnitions
from the literature for distributive, procedural, and interactional
justice, supported with examples from organizational justice re-
search, workshop participants were asked to code 20 sample
events from a Portuguese pilot study in terms of dominant justice
facet. One of the authors then presented feedback to participants,
focusing on areas where justice dimensions had been incorrectly
identiﬁed. We used the following guidelines for coding of events
that were more ambiguous. First, the respondent’s interpretation
of an event was to be given priority in identifying the dominant
justice concern. For example, ‘‘I wasn’t given the overtime I was
promised. What makes it unfair is that I didn’t get paid,’’ (As op-
posed to ‘‘What makes it unfair is that they violated their own
promise.’’) was to be coded as distributive injustice. Second, an as-
pect of an event was given more weight if it was mentioned earlier
rather than later in the event description. For example, ‘‘That man-
ager has always been biased against women. He breaks every rule
in the book to help out his friends while WE do the work,’’ was to
be coded as procedural injustice.
The author and the undergraduate research assistant agreed on
the dominant facet of justice in 88% of cases (expected agreement
36%), Cohen’s kappa = .81, z = 20.94, p < .01. Where coders dis-
agreed, agreement was reached in a subsequent discussion of
cases. For example, the following event was coded as distributive
injustice: ‘‘Someone hired for only a short time, always on the
internet for personal business, and makes more per hour than I
do’’. The following was coded as interactional injustice: ‘‘Deroga-
tory or sexist comments.’’2 Thirty-two percent of respondents did
not provide a description of an unfair event.
Probit analyses with sample selection was used to test our re-
search hypotheses. This is the most suitable approach because
our dependent variable, the type of unfair event reported, is cate-
gorical and self report. Indeed, some participants may not report
any unfair event at all making our sample potentially non-random.
Non-reporting due to perceived high levels of organizational jus-
tice does not represent a problem as our research hypotheses con-
cern those who report experiencing injustice. Yet, our results
would be suspect if respondents who provided a description of
an unfair event differed systematically on some omitted variable
from those who did not. For example, if the omitted variable was
linked to the ability for concrete reasoning, it could affect both
the reporting of the unfair event (e.g., positively), and the type of
injustice respondents bring to mind (e.g., relate positively to the
likelihood of reporting interactional injustice). Thus, our conclu-
sions using the selected sample of those who reported an unfair
event would only apply to those with high ability for concrete rea-
soning. Probit analysis with sample selection is well suited to han-
dling biases in coefﬁcient estimates that may arise in such cases,
and provides the means of testing for the presence of an omitted
variable problem (Greene, 2011; Heckman, 1979).
This approach allows the modelling of both the type of the un-
fair event that the respondent chooses to describe (in the outcome
equation) and the choice of not providing such a description (in the
selection equation). The omitted variable problem would manifest
itself as a signiﬁcant correlation, q, between error terms in the
selection and the outcome equations. Probit analysis with sample
selection allows for the estimation and testing of q. A statistically
signiﬁcant q means that omitted variables, such as the ability for
concrete reasoning, may bias coefﬁcient estimates for independent
variables if regular probit models are estimated using the selected
sample alone. A statistically insigniﬁcant q means that consistent
coefﬁcient estimates can be obtained by means of two independent
probits: one for sample selection (using the full sample), and an-
other one for the type of concern about injustice (using the se-
lected sample). Probit analysis with sample selection is a robust
way of testing our research hypotheses because coefﬁcient esti-
mates in the outcome equation are consistent irrespective of the
presence or the absence of an omitted variable problem.
There are several other advantages to using this statistical
method. First, it is a limited dependent variable model that ﬁts
the nature of our dependent variable, i.e. the type of concern about
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for all Study 1 variables with internal reliabilities in parentheses on the diagonal.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. Gender (1 = M, 0 = F) .47 .50 –
2. Age 44 11 .09* –
3. Work experience 21 11 .07 .79**
4. Managerial position (1 = Yes, 0 = No) .53 .50 .15** .02 .03
5. Past temporal orientation 3.38 .69 .01 .11* .12** .07 (.91)
6. Present temporal orientation 3.90 .63 .02 .22** .20** .08 .16** (.86)
7. Future temporal orientation 3.74 .79 .05 .00 .03 .15** .41** .52** (.93)
8. Organizational justice 3.78 1.02 .00 .11* .16** .05 .07 .22** .06 (.96)
9. Distributive injustice event, N = 335 (1 = distributive injustice, 0 = not) .47 .50 .07 .01 .07 .13* .01 .00 .12* .04
10. Procedural injustice event, N = 335 (1 = procedural injustice, 0 = not) .34 .47 .10 .05 .02 .14* .01 .11* .20** .11
11. Interactional injustice event, N = 335 (1 = interactional injustice, 0 = not) .19 .39 .04 .07 .06 .02 .02 .15** .10 .08
Note: N = 494.
* p < .05.
** p < .01 (two-tailed).
2 An example of an event coded as procedural injustice is ‘‘Gender discrimination’’.
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injustice, which is either (1) a concern about distributive injustice
(0/1 dummy variable), or (2) a concern about interactional injus-
tice (0/1 dummy variable). Thus, it is more efﬁcient than the linear
regression analysis (Greene, 2011). Note that our dependent vari-
ables are mutually exclusive, but not mutually exhaustive (there
are also concerns about procedural injustice). Second, by modelling
the source of missing data (in the selection equation), we can shed
light on speciﬁc reasons for missing data. For example, we can ver-
ify that the non-reporting of unfair events was more likely for
those who had higher perceptions of organizational justice.
Separate analyses were run for concerns about distributive
injustice and for concerns about interactional injustice. For identi-
ﬁcation purposes (i.e. being able to solve for unique values of
parameters in this model) it is advisable that at least one predictor
of sample selection be different from the set of predictors in the
outcome equation (Greene, 2011). We use organizational justice
as the variable that predicts sample selection (higher perceptions
of organizational justice should relate negatively to the reporting
of unjust events, but will not predict the speciﬁc type of concerns
about injustice). The remaining predictors included temporal focus
(future, present, and past) and demographic controls. To conduct
the analyses we used the Stata built-in command heckprob.
Distributive injustice
To test Hypothesis 1 regarding the effects of temporal orienta-
tion on salience of concerns about distributive injustice, we used
reporting a distributive injustice as the dependent variable in the
outcome equation. Estimation results are presented in columns
1–3 of Table 2.
As in simple probit estimations, for both the selection and the
outcome equation, coefﬁcient estimates indicate whether higher
levels of independent variables relate positively or negatively to
the likelihood of observing the dependent variable equal to 1, i.e.
that respondent reports an unjust event or that the injustice re-
ported is distributive. For example, as expected, coefﬁcients in
the selection equation (column 1) tell us that higher perceptions
of organizational justice lead to lower likelihood that the respon-
dent reports an unjust event, b = .33, p < .01. Although a number
of coefﬁcients were statistically signiﬁcant in the selection equa-
tion3, the correlation, q, between error terms in the selection and
the outcome equations, was not statistically signiﬁcant, showing
no evidence of an omitted variable problem.
Relevant to the test of our research hypotheses are coefﬁcient
estimates in the outcome equation (column 2). Consistent with
Hypothesis 1, higher levels of future focus are associated with a
greater likelihood of reporting a distributively unjust event in the
outcome equation, b = .26, p < .05.
Interactional injustice
To test Hypothesis 2 regarding the effects of higher levels of
present focus on salience of concerns about interactional injustice,
we used reporting an interactional injustice event as the depen-
dent variable in the outcome equation. Estimation results are pre-
sented in columns 4–6 of Table 2. Consistent with Hypothesis 2,
higher levels of present focus are associated with a greater likeli-
hood of reporting an interactionally unjust event, b = .31, p < .05.
Discussion
Study 1 shows that individual differences in the levels of future
versus present temporal focus can predict the type of unjust events
employees report. Greater levels of future focus relate positively to
reporting of distributively unjust events, whereas greater levels of
present focus relate positively to reporting of interactionally unjust
events.
Study 1, however, has several limitations. First, the data were
cross-sectional, which prevents us from making claims regarding
the direction of causality. It is possible, for instance, that individu-
als concerned with distributive injustice are more future-focused
or that a third variable inﬂuenced both the levels of a speciﬁc tem-
poral focus and the unfair events reported. Second, we do not know
the effect of temporal distance (the other dimension of temporal
perspective) on the salience of types of injustice. For example,
what are the effects of an individual looking farther (versus nearer)
into the future or the past? Third, it is possible that individuals
responding to items in the temporal focus scale such as ‘‘I live
my life in the present,’’ and ‘‘I think about what my future has in
store’’ attached different meaning to the terms ‘‘present,’’ and ‘‘fu-
ture.’’ For example, people may differ in the extent to which they
incorporate the recent past or the very near future into ‘‘the pres-
ent’’ (Bluedorn & Martin, 2008; Shipp et al., 2009). Therefore, it be-
comes important to explore the effects of more objectively
speciﬁed timeframes. Study 2 was conducted to address these
issues.
Study 2
Numerous studies have shown that temporal perspectives can
be invoked by asking people to focus on a speciﬁc timeframe
(Bavelas, 1973; Trope & Liberman, 2003). In Study 2 we used an
experimental design in which we manipulated temporal orienta-
tion and temporal distance (rather than simply measuring tempo-
ral focus as an individual difference). Thus, we tested the effects of
temporal perspective on recalled past and anticipated future
unjust events. The experimental design also allowed us to test
the direction of causality between temporal perspectives and the
type of unjust events reported by employees.
Temporal orientation and employee reporting of unjust events
The difference between future (imagined) unfair events and
past (recalled) unfair events as brought to mind by employees is
important for a number of reasons. First, employee motivation
may be affected not only by the (in)justice they have experienced,
but also by just or unjust events they expect to experience (Shipp
et al., 2009). Second, the ability to imagine speciﬁc events is known
to contribute to their perceived likelihood (Kahneman & Tversky,
1974). Third, the injustice a person anticipates can affect employee
in-the-moment experience of fair or unfair treatment (Davidson &
Friedman, 1998). In other words, ‘‘If employees expect to see injus-
tice, they probably will’’ (Shapiro & Kirkman, 2001, p. 167). It
therefore becomes important to investigate directly the extent to
which anticipated injustice differs from or is similar to experienced
(and recalled) injustice (Shapiro & Kirkman, 2001).
We expect that there will be differences between the types of
injustice anticipated and the types recalled ceteris paribus (i.e.,
controlling for temporal distance, the effects of which we consider
below). When employees look to the future (versus the past) they
will construe the employment relationship at a higher level
because future events are uncertain and thus are more psycholog-
ically distant than the events lived in the past. At this high level of
construal, deﬁnitional aspects of work should be more prominent,
including the outcomes employees receive or do not receive in
return for their efforts. Therefore, future orientation (as opposed
to past) should be associated with greater reporting of distributive
injustice. In contrast, past orientation should result in greater
3 Higher level of present temporal orientation is associated with a higher likelihood
of reporting an unjust event, b = .31, p < .05, and men are less likely than women to
report an unjust event, b = .38, p < .01, whereas those occupying managerial
positions are more likely to do so, b = .25, p < .10.
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salience of interactional injustice because the employment rela-
tionship will be construed at a lower, less abstract, and more con-
textualized level.
Hypothesis 3. Inducing future (versus past) temporal orientation
will relate positively to the proportion of distributively unjust
events reported.
Hypothesis 4. Inducing past (versus future) temporal orientation
will relate positively to the proportion of interactionally unjust
events reported.
Temporal distance and employee reporting of unjust events
Consistent with construal level theory (Trope & Liberman,
2003), the farther away the point in time which individuals con-
sider the more likely it is that they will focus on general and deﬁ-
nitional aspects of the employment relationship. The closer in time
an event, the more likely it is that contextual details and speciﬁc
aspects of the work experience will also be included. Signiﬁcant re-
search evidence suggests that the effects of temporal distance are
symmetric for past and future orientations, and are largely the re-
sult of moving away from the present (Spreng & Levine, 2006).
Events that are distant in time, whether in the future or the past,
are also more distant psychologically and will be construed more
abstractly or generally (Liberman & Trope, 2008; Trope et al.,
2007).
Our argument that distributive aspects are prominent in high
level construals of the employment relationship received support
in Study 1. This effect of high versus low levels of construal should
also play out for temporal distance, such that distributive aspects
(which generally dominate high level construals of the employ-
ment relationship) are salient in more distant versus proximate
temporal horizons while interactional aspects (which are generally
part of low level construals (the ‘‘how’’) of the employment rela-
tionship) are salient in more proximate versus more distant tem-
poral horizons.
Hypothesis 5. Inducing greater (versus less) temporal distance
will relate positively to the proportion of distributively unjust
events reported.
Hypothesis 6. Inducing greater (versus less) temporal distance




Four hundred and sixteen US-based employees were recruited
online through MarketTools, Inc. Forty one respondents (10% of
the sample) did not pass the attention check in the form of a trap
question in the survey and were excluded from the analysis. Forty-
seven percent of the ﬁnal sample was male, with an average age of
40. Seventy-seven percent had a junior college degree at a mini-
mum, including 15% who had completed graduate studies. On
average, work experience was 20 years and average tenure with
the current employer was 7 years. A variety of occupations was
represented, including ofﬁce and administrative support (15%),
Table 2
Probit analysis of concerns about injustice as a function of individual’s (trait) temporal focus.
Independent variables Distributive injustice Interactional injustice
Selection equation Outcome
equation
q Selection equation Outcome
equation
q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Organizational justice .33*** .32***
(.000) (.000)
Past temporal orientation .05 .08 .07 .08
(.649) (.502) (.509) (.463)
Present temporal orientation .31** .10 .33*** .31**
(.011) (.485) (.008) (.030)
Future temporal orientation .13 .26** .11 .16
(.214) (.018) (.261) (.167)
Age .01 .01 .00 .01
(.546) (.297) (.819) (.483)
Gender .38*** .12 .39*** .04
(.002) (.462) (.002) (.797)
Work experience .00 .01 .01 .00
(.811) (.132) (.566) (.997)
Managerial position .25* .27* .25** .01
(.050) (.071) (.047) (.932)
Constant .35 .86 .23 .33 3.09*** .97
(.518) (.310) (.618)a (.540) (.000) (.302)a
Observations 494 494 494 494 494 494
Log-likelihood (full model) 510.28, W(7) = 14.71,
p < .05
440.42, W(7) = 14.86,
p < .05
Log-likelihood (no temporal orientation
variables)
522.16, W(4) = 9.36,
p < .10
453.63, W(4) = 3.05, ns
% Increase in ﬁt, U2, due to temporal
orientation
2.28 2.91
Note: p-Values in parentheses.
W is Wald test statistic testing the ﬁt of the model compared to a baseline model with no explanatory variables other than the constant term (v2 distributed).
U2 is computed as (1  {[Log-likelihood (full model)]/[Log-likelihood (no temporal orientation variables)]}).
* p < .10 (two-tailed).
** p < .05 (two-tailed).
*** p < .01 (two-tailed).
a p-Value for q, the correlation of error terms in the selection and the outcome equation, is obtained using the likelihood ratio v2 test.
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sales (11%), business and ﬁnancial operations (9%), and manage-
ment (8%).
Participants completed an online survey. They were randomly
assigned to one of four between-subjects conditions and asked to
describe either a recalled or imagined unfair event at work: (a)
over the past year and at least 2 months ago (distant past condi-
tion), (b) over the past 2 weeks (recent past), (c) over the next year
and not earlier than 2 months from now (distant future), or (d)
over the next 2 weeks (near future). Sample instructions read ‘‘In
the following pages, you will be asked to reﬂect on your workplace
events OVER THE NEXT TWO WEEKS. Before you begin, please,
think of the NEXT TWO WEEKS at work (if you expect to change
jobs in the meantime, feel free to think of the workplace where
you intend to spend most of the time in these 2 weeks). What will
they be like? What events will be happening at work over the
NEXT TWO WEEKS? Try to imagine those events as vividly as
you can. Imagine an UNFAIR event that can happen to you in your
workplace over the NEXT TWO WEEKS. Take a minute or two to
imagine the event. What will make it so unfair? In the space below,
describe the unfair event.’’
Experimental conditions were coded using two dummy vari-
ables: future orientation (1 = Future, 0 = Past), and temporal dis-
tance (1 = Distant, 0 = Near). Thus, condition ‘‘distant past’’ was
coded as (0; 1), ‘‘0’’ for ‘‘future orientation’’ and ‘‘1’’ for ‘‘temporal
distance’’, ‘‘recent past’’ as (0; 0), ‘‘near future’’ as (1; 0), and ‘‘dis-
tant future’’ as (1; 1).
Injustice recalled and anticipated
Unfair events described by participants were independently
coded by the ﬁrst author and an undergraduate research assistant
using organizational justice scales and deﬁnitions of justice facets
and using the same procedures as in Study 1 (Bies, 2001; Bies &
Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal, 1976). Both coders were
blind to the experimental conditions. Events coded as distributive
injustice include: ‘‘A higher-up could take credit for work that I’ve
done’’ (future) and ‘‘A new position was created that does less
work than my position and carries less responsibility, but is paid
more’’ (past). Events coded as interactional injustice include: ‘‘A
customer comes in and misinterprets something I say, construing
it to be a personal insult and continues to get angrier no matter
what I try to do to smooth the situation’’ (future) and ‘‘I was moved
down on structure chart. The way I found out was looking at our
website. I was never told’’ (past). The two coders agreed on the fa-
cet of dominant justice concern in 88% of cases (expected agree-
ment 38%), Cohen’s kappa = .80, z = 17.42, p < .01. Where coders
disagreed, agreement was reached in a subsequent discussion of
cases. Thirty-nine percent of respondents did not provide a
description of an unfair event. The distribution of non-response
across experimental conditions is shown in Table 3.
Control variables
Perceptions of organizational justice. Perceptions of overall orga-
nizational justice were measured using three items from Ambrose
and Schminke’s (2009) scale, including ‘‘Overall, I am treated fairly
by my organization’’ (a = .98).
Demographics. Age, years of work experience, organizational po-




Whether participants appropriately used future or past tense in
their event descriptions, as well as the question ‘‘How many days
ago/In how many days from now did/will the event happen,
approximately?’’ served as manipulation checks. These showed
that respondents followed instructions with regard to the temporal
condition.
When respondents were asked to describe a future event they
were more likely to use the future verb tense (21% in future condi-
tions versus 0% in past conditions, z = 5.03, p < .01). When respon-
dents were asked to describe a past event they were more likely to
use the past verb tense (65% in past conditions versus 5% in future
conditions, z = 9.77, p < .01). In addition, whereas only 18% of
respondents in the two past conditions did not use any verbs in
describing (past) unfair events, 43% of respondents in the two fu-
ture conditions did not use verbs in describing (future) unfair
events, z = 4.80, p < .01. Given that the use of verbs reﬂects con-
crete rather than abstract reasoning (Coenen, Hedebouw, & Semin,
2006), this pattern is consistent with our hypothesized relation-
ship between past temporal orientation and more concrete
reasoning.
There were signiﬁcant differences in the reported number of
days (since/before the event) between distant past versus recent
past conditions,M = 108 versusM = 7, t(104) = 3.65, p < .01, and be-
tween distant future versus near future conditions, M = 77 versus
M = 8, t(119) = 6.20, p < .01. The differences for recent past versus
near future and distant past versus distant future were not signif-
icant (t(100) = .37, ns, and t(123) = 1.21, ns, respectively).
Reporting of unjust events
Descriptive statistics, Cronbach alphas, and correlations are pre-
sented in Table 4.
We again used probit analyses with sample selection to test our
research hypotheses. This allowed us to evaluate the effects of
temporal distance and temporal orientation in a single model, by
including both as key independent variables in the outcome equa-
tion. Perceptions of organizational justice were included as a pre-
dictor variable in the selection but not the outcome equation for
identiﬁcation purposes. Estimation results are presented in Table 5.
As in Study 1, higher perceptions of organizational justice and
being male were associated with a lower likelihood of reporting
an unjust event. Future temporal orientation and temporal dis-
tance related positively to the likelihood of reporting an unjust
event.
Temporal orientation
To test Hypothesis 3, we examined the outcome equation when
the dependent variable was a dummy indicating that participants
described a distributively unjust event (Table 5, column 2). Distrib-
utive injustice events were more likely to be reported when future-
orientation was induced, b = .58, p < .05, providing support for
Hypothesis 3. To test Hypothesis 4, we examined the same coefﬁ-
cient when the dependent variable was a dummy indicating that
participants described an interactionally unjust event (Table 5, col-
umn 5). Interactional injustice events were less likely to be re-
ported when future-orientation was induced, b = .81, p < .01,
providing support for Hypothesis 4.
Temporal distance
To test Hypothesis 5, we examined coefﬁcient estimates for
temporal distance in the outcome equation when the dependent
variable was a dummy indicating that participants described a dis-
tributively unjust event (Table 5, column 2). The positive coefﬁ-
cient estimate for temporal distance was not statistically
signiﬁcant, b = .24, ns. To test Hypothesis 6, we examined the same
coefﬁcient when the dependent variable was a dummy indicating
that participants described an interactionally unjust event (Table 5,
column 5). Interactional injustice events were less likely to be re-
ported when greater temporal distance was induced, b = .41,
p < .10, two-sided. Thus, Hypothesis 6 was supported: temporal
distance reduced the salience of interactionally unjust events.
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Discussion
Study 2 provides support that induced temporal perspective
(both orientation and distance) can inﬂuence the type of unjust
events that employees recall and anticipate. Events relating pri-
marily to outcomes were more salient to participants asked to
bring to mind future versus past unfairness. In contrast, events
relating primarily to interpersonal treatment were more salient
when participants were asked to focus on past versus future time-
frames, and less salient at greater temporal distance.
Study 3
In our ﬁrst two studies, trait temporal focus and manipulated
temporal perspective both related to the reporting of unfair out-
comes versus unfair interpersonal treatment at work. However,
we have not directly tested our proposed mediator: that temporal
perspective inﬂuences the salience of different types of unjust
events because it affects how the employment relationship is con-
strued. In Study 3 we examine the mechanism behind our ﬁndings.
Speciﬁcally, we test whether high versus low level construal of the
employment relationship is the reason why focusing on future and
distant timeframes makes distributive injustice more salient and
interactional injustice less salient.
Two considerations guided our design of Study 3. First, fact that
temporal perspective can affect the abstractness versus concrete-
ness with which experiences are represented is well established
(Liberman & Trope, 2008). Second, Study 1 and Study 2 provide evi-
dence that temporal perspective affects the salience of distributive
versus interactional unfair events at work. In Study 3, we want to
show that the effect of temporal perspective on the salience of dis-
tributive versus interactional injustice is mediated by the abstract-
ness of cognitions about employment.
As Spencer, Zanna, and Fong (2005) and Stone-Romero and
Rosopa (2008) point out, one of the better ways to support a medi-
ational argument (which involves at least two causal inferences) is
to use an ‘‘experimental-causal-chain’’ design and manipulate both
the independent variable and the mediator. Given that the effects
of our independent variable (temporal perspective) on the mediat-
ing psychological process (cognitions) are well established, what
remains to be demonstrated is that our mediator inﬂuences our
dependent variable (type of injustice). This requires us to ﬁnd a
way of changing the abstractness of cognitions about employment
while holding temporal perspective constant (Bolger & Amarel,
2007; Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010).
Hypothesis 7. Holding a speciﬁc temporal perspective constant,
abstract versus concrete cognitions about employment will relate
positively to the proportion of distributively unfair events
reported.
Hypotheses 8. Holding a speciﬁc temporal perspective constant,
abstract versus concrete cognitions about employment will relate
negatively to the proportion of interactionally unfair events
reported.
Method
Participants, design, and procedure
Six hundred and forty US-based employees were recruited on-
line through CT Marketing Group, Inc. Forty-ﬁve percent of the
Table 3
Descriptive statistics of variables and rates of non-response across experimental conditions in Study 2.
Continuous variables Distant past, N = 95 Recent past, N = 94 Near future, N = 94 Distant future, N = 92
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Organizational justice 5.30a 1.68 5.33a 1.80 5.65a 1.40 4.88 1.58
Age 40 12 40 11 40 12 42 12
Work experience 19 12 19 11 20 13 21 12
Categorical variables Proportions
Gender (1 = M, 0 = F) .43 .45 .46 .52
Managerial position (1 = Yes, 0 = No) .41 .39 .39 .37
Non-response (1 = Non-response, 0 = Responded) .35 .52a .38 .28
In total events reported N = 62 N = 45 N = 58 N = 66
Distributive injustice events .47 .27 .60 .71
Interactional injustice events .24 .27 .16 0
Note: Values marked with letters are signiﬁcantly higher in that condition than in the other condition(s).
Values marked by the same letter are not different from each other at 5% signiﬁcance level.
Table 4
Descriptive statistics for all Study 2 variables with internal reliabilities in parentheses on the diagonal.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1. Gender (1 = M, 0 = F) .46 .50 –
2. Age 40 12 .30** –
3. Work experience 20 12 .24** .87**
4. Managerial position .39 .49 .14** .06 .05
5. Organizational justice 5.29 1.64 .02 .09 .08 – (.98)
6. Distributive injustice event, N = 231 (0 = does not involve distributive injustice, 1 = involves distributive
injustice)
.53 .50 .21** .15* .07 .11 .05
7. Procedural injustice event, N = 231 (0 = does not involve procedural injustice, 1 = involves procedural
injustice)
.31 .46 .05 .03 .06 .04 .05
8. Interactional injustice event, N = 231 (0 = does not involve interactional injustice, 1 = involves interactional
injustice)
.16 .36 .21** .17* .18** .09 .01
Note: N = 375.
* p < .05.
** p < .01 (two-tailed).
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sample were male. Average age was 42, and average work experi-
ence was 18 years. Seventy-three percent had a junior college de-
gree at a minimum, including 20% who had completed graduate
studies. A variety of occupations was represented, including man-
agement (16%), ofﬁce and administrative support (9%), healthcare
(8%), computer and mathematical (7%), and education, training,
and library (7%).
Participants completed an online survey. They were randomly
assigned to one of four between-subjects conditions of a 2 (ab-
stract versus concrete)  2 (next 2 weeks versus past 2 weeks)
experimental design (160 participants per condition). Thus, the ef-
fects of abstractness versus concreteness of cognitions about
employment could be studied while holding the temporal perspec-
tive (either future or past-oriented) constant.
Demographics and perceptions of overall organizational justice
were measured prior to experimental manipulations. The manipu-
lation of cognitions about employment preceded the manipulation
of temporal perspective. Because we used a novel task to manipu-
late cognitions about employment, we collected measures of posi-
tive and negative affect to control for potential mood effects.
Manipulation of cognitions about employment. We developed a def-
inition/description task to manipulate the abstractness of cogni-
tions about employment. The task was presented as an opinion
poll concerning online dictionaries versus online blogs.
As discussed earlier, abstract cognitions are typically short and
simplistic, containing core features of experiences and little if any
idiosyncratic detail, akin to dictionary deﬁnitions. Thus, partici-
pants in the abstract condition were asked to read three concise
deﬁnitions (for ‘‘autumn’’, ‘‘war’’, and ‘‘concert’’) taken from an on-
line dictionary (www.dictionary.com). In order to engage partici-
pants in the task, they were asked to rate each deﬁnition in
terms of appropriate length (is it too long?) and generality (would
most people agree with the deﬁnition?). Participants were then
asked to deﬁne ‘‘work’’ in the following way:
‘‘We now ask you to provide a deﬁnition of ‘work’ (or,
employment):
In general, what is ‘work’? Please provide a deﬁnition of work
that is short and simple. Your deﬁnition should include only
the essential characteristics of the employment relationship
that most people would ﬁnd true. Your deﬁnition should iden-
tify essential feature(s) of work that are common to all types of
occupations and jobs, and that distinguish ‘work’ from other
domains of life
It might help your thinking to imagine that you are explaining
what work is to someone who has no experience with work,
for example, a child.
State your deﬁnition in the textbox below. ‘Work is ____.’’’
In contrast, concrete cognitions about employment would have
to depart from a mere deﬁnition and include contextual details and
speciﬁcities of one’s employment relationship. For this purpose,
participants in the concrete condition were asked to read and rate
three lengthier descriptions of experiences (for ‘‘autumn’’, ‘‘war’’,
and ‘‘concert’’) taken from online blogs. Participants were then
asked to provide a description for ‘‘work’’ with the following
instructions.
‘‘We now ask you to provide a personal description of ‘work’ (or,
employment).
In your case, what is ‘’work’? Please describe work from your
experience, using speciﬁc and concrete details about your
employment relationship.
Table 5
Probit analysis of unjust events as a function of experimentally induced temporal perspective.
Independent variables Distributive injustice Interactional injustice
Selection equation Outcome
equation
q Selection equation Outcome
equation
q
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Organizational justice .20*** .20***
(.000) (.000)
Future orientation (1 = Future, 0 = Past) .32** .58** .31** .81***
(.020) (.011) (.024) (.001)
Temporal distance (1 = Distant, 0 = Near) .34** .24 .32** .41*
(.014) (.228) (.019) (.086)
Age .01 .04** .01 .00
(.242) (.020) (.283) (.886)
Gender .36** .37** .34** .55*
(.013) (.037) (.020) (.054)
Work experience .00 .03* .00 .02
(.888) (.073) (.974) (.352)
Managerial position .18 .14 .17 .11
(.199) (.411) (.230) (.661)
Constant .28 1.08* .67 .26 .11 .11
(.387) (.061) (.170)a (.424) (.852) (.838)a
Observations 375 375 375 375 375 375
Log-likelihood (full model) 367.23, W(6) = 19.69,
p < .01
310.85, W(6) = 25.53,
p < .01
Log-likelihood (no temporal variables) 384.32, W(4) = 16.88,
p < .01
323.98, W(4) = 13.13,
p < .05
% Increase in ﬁt, U2, due to temporal
orientation
4.45 4.05
Note: p-Values in parentheses.
W is Wald test statistic. U2 is computed as (1  {[Log-likelihood (full model)]/[Log-likelihood (no temporal variables)]}).
* p < .10 (two-tailed).
** p < .05 (two-tailed).
*** p < .01 (two-tailed).
a p-Value for the signiﬁcance of q, the correlation of error terms in the selection and the outcome equation, is obtained using the likelihood ratio v2 test.
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Your description should identify aspects of work that you have
experienced in speciﬁc situations and at speciﬁc moments in
time. Your description should identify speciﬁc features of work
that distinguish your workplace from other workplaces.
It might help your thinking to imagine that you are explaining
what work is to someone who has lots of work experience, for
example, a recent retiree.
State your description in the textbox below. ‘Work to me is
____.’’’
Manipulation of temporal perspective. In the recent past (future)
conditions, participants were asked to reﬂect on their workplace
experiences ‘‘over the past (next) 2 weeks’’ and to report an unfair
event from that time period (see Study 2 for exact instructions).
Measures
Unfair events at work. As in Study 1 and Study 2, unfair events de-
scribed by participants were independently coded by one of the
authors and a research assistant using organizational justice scales
and deﬁnitions of justice facets (Bies, 2001; Bies & Moag, 1986;
Colquitt, 2001; Leventhal, 1976). The two coders agreed on the
dominant facet of justice in 94% of reported events (expected
agreement 27%), Cohen’s kappa = .91, z = 31.46, p < .01. Where cod-
ers disagreed, agreement was reached in a subsequent discussion
of cases.
Control variables
Positive and negative affect. We used the short 10-item Positive
Affect Negative Affect Schedule (Thompson, 2007) to measure the
level of positive and negative affect following the deﬁnition/
description task (a = .82 for positive affect, and a = .91 for negative
affect).
Perceptions of organizational justice. Perceptions of overall orga-
nizational justice were measured using three items from Ambrose
and Schminke’s (2009) scale, as in previous studies (a = .96).
Demographics. Age, years of work experience, organizational po-
sition (management versus not), and gender were measured via
self-report.
Results
Descriptive statistics, Cronbach alphas, and correlations are pre-
sented in Table 6.
Manipulation checks were necessary to ensure that (a) the def-
inition/description task used to induce concrete versus abstract
thinking affected respondent cognitions about employment (our
mediator variable) but not other potential mediators such as
respondent affect (Bullock et al., 2010), and (b) participants consid-
ered future versus past timeframes as a result of our manipulation
of the temporal perspective. Thirty-four percent of respondents
were excluded from the analyses because they did not provide
the requested deﬁnition/description of ‘‘work’’.
Manipulation of cognitions about employment
The deﬁnitions/descriptions of work provided by participants
were coded in terms of whether they (a) mentioned only work out-
comes, such as salaries, bonuses, and other material rewards
(Only_outcome: 1 = only outcomes mentioned, 0 = otherwise), (b)
mentioned no work outcomes (No_outcome: 1 = no outcomes
mentioned, 0 = otherwise), and (c) mentioned social interactions
at work, including with co-workers, supervisors, clients or students
(Interaction: 1 = social interactions mentioned, 0 = otherwise). For
example, the deﬁnition ‘‘Work is the action of performing one’s
skill-set for monetary compensation’’ would be coded as 1 on
Only_outcome, 0 on No_outcome, and 0 on Interaction. The follow-
ing description was coded 0 on Only_outcome, 1 on No_outcome,
and 1 on Interaction.
‘‘Work to me is listening, learning and teaching skills for people
to use later on in life. I have been in management for many
years and come across many different types of people. Some
people were born to lead and others to follow. In my position
as manager I feel that I am able to lead because I am patient
but ﬁrm and being a supplier to vendors who count on us to
lead I feel having the right person to lead is very important to
both parties.’’
All deﬁnitions and descriptions of work were coded by one of
the authors and a research assistant who were both blind to the
experimental condition. Rates of agreement between the two cod-
ers were above 95% (expected agreement for the three dummy
variables varied from 50% to 67%), Cohen’s kappa > .90, z > 18.68,
p < .01.
To test whether inducing abstract versus concrete cognitions
about employment related positively to the salience of work out-
comes and negatively to the salience of social interactions at
work, we tested differences between conditions on variables
Only_outcome, No_outcome, and Interaction. Referring only to
work outcomes was signiﬁcantly more likely for deﬁnitions (ab-
stract cognitions) versus descriptions (concrete cognitions), 77%
versus 27%, z = 10.34, p < .01. Not referring to work outcomes
was signiﬁcantly more likely for descriptions (concrete cogni-
tions), versus deﬁnitions (abstract cognitions), 55% versus 21%,
z = 7.19, p < .01. Referring to social interactions at work was more
likely for descriptions (concrete cognitions) versus deﬁnitions
(abstract cognitions), 43% versus 1%, z = 10.70, p < .01. Thus,
inducing abstract versus concrete cognitions about employment
worked as anticipated.4
Moreover, there was no difference in levels of respondent affect
in terms of either positive affect (t(422) = .41, ns) or negative affect
(t(422) = .70, ns) across conditions. See Table 7 for descriptive
statistics of control and dependent variables, as well as rates of
non-response, across deﬁnition/description tasks.
Manipulation of temporal perspective
When respondents had to describe a future event they were
more likely to use the future verb tense (34% in future conditions
versus 0% in past conditions, z = 7.32, p < .01). When respondents
had to describe a past event they were more likely to use the past
verb tense (70% in past conditions versus 9% in future conditions,
z = 11.04, p < .01).
Hypothesis testing
Descriptive statistics for proportions of event types, control
variables, as well as rates of non-response, are presented in Table 8.
To test Hypothesis 7, we ﬁrst compared proportions of distrib-
utively unfair events reported when abstract versus concrete cog-
nitions about employment were induced, holding the temporal
perspective constant.
Conditional on being asked about the next 2 weeks at work,
respondents were signiﬁcantly more likely to report distributive
injustice when abstract versus concrete cognitions about employ-
ment were induced, 61% versus 48%, z = 1.75, p < .05. Conditional
on being asked about the past 2 weeks at work, respondents
were signiﬁcantly more likely to report distributive injustice
4 Rates of non-response varied signiﬁcantly between the deﬁnition versus
description task, z = 2.34, p < .05. So we conducted selection probit analyses to model
sample selection explicitly and allow for potential correlation in the error terms of the
selection and the outcome equation. Results showed that our conclusions were robust
to this alternative way of estimating the magnitude of the effects of inducing abstract
versus concrete cognitions about employment (data available from the ﬁrst author
upon request).
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when abstract versus concrete cognitions about employment
were induced, 48% versus 27%, z = 2.42, p < .01. Thus, Hypothesis
7 was supported: reporting of distributive injustice related posi-
tively to inducing abstract versus concrete cognitions about
employment.
Evidence of mediation was equally strong for the salience of
interactionally unfair events. Conditional on being asked about
the future 2 weeks at work, respondents were signiﬁcantly more
likely to report interactional injustice when concrete versus ab-
stract cognitions about employment were induced, 31% versus
16%, z = 2.28, p < .05. Conditional on being asked about the past
2 weeks at work, respondents were signiﬁcantly more likely to
report interactional injustice when concrete versus abstract cogni-
tions about employment were induced, 54% versus 35%, z = 2.12,
p < .05. Thus, Hypothesis 8 was supported: reporting of interac-
tional injustice related positively to inducing concrete versus
abstract cognitions about employment.5
Discussion
In Study 3 we tested the mechanism underlying the effect of
temporal perspective on the salience of speciﬁc types of injustice
at work. Holding temporal perspective constant, inducing abstract
versus concrete cognitions about employment increased the sal-
ience of distributive injustice and decreased the salience of interac-
tional injustice.
By developing and testing a novel way of manipulating cogni-
tions about employment (abstract versus concrete), we also dem-
onstrated that when employees represented work at a high
versus low level of construal (i.e., by deﬁning work) they focused
on work outcomes. In contrast, when they were asked to represent
work at a lower level of construal (i.e., by providing a speciﬁc
description of work), outcomes were less salient and social interac-
tions and process more salient.
General discussion
This research demonstrates that employee temporal perspec-
tive, whether measured as an individual difference or manipulated
as a situational factor, affects the salience of types of workplace
injustice. Individuals with higher levels of future focus were more
Table 6
Descriptive statistics for all Study 3 variables with internal reliabilities in parentheses on the diagonal.
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1. Gender (1 = M, 0 = F) .34 .47
2. Age 44 11 .02
3. Managerial position .45 .50 .17*** .00
4. Organizational justice 5.38 1.40 .04 .06 .06 (.96)
5. Positive affect 4.46 1.24 .20*** .07 .23*** .12** (.82)
6. Negative affect 1.81 1.14 .20*** .23*** .13*** .22*** .08* (.91)
7. Only outcome .54 .50 .00 .06 .01 .03 .01 .01
8. No outcome .37 .48 .03 .05 .03 .04 .02 .00 .82***
9. Other people mentioned .21 .40 .12** .18*** .00 .06 .04 .07 .54*** .42***
10. Distributive injustice event, N = 303 (1 = Distributive injustice,
0 = Not)
.47 .50 .03 .11* .02 .01 .02 .04 .14** .09 .19***
11. Procedural injustice event, N = 303 (1 = Procedural injustice,
0 = Not)
.21 .40 .01 .12** .03 .04 .01 .13** .03 .02 .03
12. Interactional injustice event, N = 303 (1 = Interactional injustice,
0 = Not)
.32 .47 .02 .01 .00 .04 .03 .07 .18*** .11* .17***
Note: N = 424.
* p < .10.
** p < .05 (two-tailed).
*** p < .01 (two-tailed).
Table 7
Descriptive statistics of control and dependent variables, as well as rates of non-response, across deﬁnition/description tasks in Study 3.
Continuous variables Deﬁnition (abstract), N = 226 Description (concrete), N = 198
M SD M SD
Age 43 10 45a 11
Organizational justice 5.50a 1.39 5.23 1.40
Positive affect 4.48 1.24 4.44 1.24
Negative affect 1.85 1.25 1.77 1.01
Categorical variables Proportions
Gender (1 = M, 0 = F) .36 .33
Less than 5 years of work experience (1 = Yes, 0 = No) .04 .09a
More than 20 years of work experience (1 = Yes, 0 = No) .43 .47
Managerial position (1 = Yes, 0 = No) .46 .44
Only outcome (1 = Yes, 0 = No) .77a .27
No outcome (1 = Yes, 0 = No) .21 .55a
Interaction (1 = Yes, 0 = No) .01 .43a
Non-response (proportion of N = 320 per condition) .29 .38a
Note: N = 424. Values marked with letters are signiﬁcantly higher in that condition than in the other condition(s). Values marked by the same letter are not different from each
other at 5% signiﬁcance level.
5 Rates of failure to describe an unfair event were different across the experimental
conditions, and so were several control variables. Thus, we conducted additional
analyses using selection probits. Results showed that our conclusions were robust
(data available from the ﬁrst author upon request).
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likely to bring to mind concerns about unfair outcomes, whereas
individuals with higher levels of present focus were more likely
to bring to mind concerns about unfair interpersonal treatment
(Study 1). Employees asked to focus on future (versus past) and
distant (versus near) timeframes were more likely to bring to mind
events involving unfair outcomes and less likely to bring to mind
events involving unfair interpersonal treatment (Study 2). This pat-
tern of ﬁndings was consistent with our hypotheses regarding
changes in the salience of types of injustice due to the effect of
temporal perspective on cognitions about employment. Our third
study provided additional support for this argument in that ab-
stract versus concrete cognitions about employment exerted ef-
fects on the salience of distributively versus interactionally unfair
events controlling for temporal perspective. In particular, distribu-
tively unjust events were more salient when cognitions about
employment were abstract, whereas interactionally unfair events
were more salient when cognitions about employment were
concrete.
This research has several strengths that give us conﬁdence in
our main ﬁndings. First, as participants in all three studies were
full-time employees from a variety of different occupations, our
ﬁndings appear to be generalizable across occupations and age
groups. Second, we examined the effects of temporal perspective
as both an individual difference (Study 1) and as a manipulation
(Study 2 and Study 3). Third, given that our studies relied on spon-
taneously generated concerns about injustice (with a high likeli-
hood that some participants would not report unjust events – as
indeed was the case) our use of probit models with sample selec-
tion for hypothesis testing provided a more rigorous test of our
hypotheses than using only the data of those who reported unfair
events.
It is important to note that several alternative explanations fail
to adequately account for the pattern of our ﬁndings. For example,
it could be argued that distributive injustice was more salient in
anticipation and over greater temporal distance because it evoked
greater affective reactions than interactional injustice. However,
both theoretical and empirical work in the ﬁeld of organizational
justice argues that it is in fact interactional injustice that is more
affect-laden (Bies, 1987; Bies & Moag, 1986). Furthermore, the
memory and cognition literature presents mixed evidence on the
accessibility of affect-laden memories (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000). Our Study 3 results show that the observed differential sal-
ience of distributively unjust and interactionally unjust events in
our sample is not due to differences in the level of respondent po-
sitive or negative affect, but due to abstract versus concrete cogni-
tions about employment.
Second, if interpersonal interactions are more frequent at work
than outcome allocations, it could be argued that our ﬁndings re-
sult from respondents matching the frequency of distributive and
interactional injustice to, respectively, longer and shorter time-
frames. However, the frequency of distributive versus interactional
injustice does not explain our results. First, when respondents
were asked to report an unjust event in Study 1, the task was time-
frame-neutral. Second, in Study 2 even when people considered a
time period of equal length (2 weeks), distributive injustice was
more salient in the future timeframe whereas interactional injus-
tice was more salient in the past timeframe.
An additional strength of this paper is that it contributes to a
person-centric understanding of organizational justice (Guo, Rupp,
Weiss, & Trougakos, in press; Weiss & Rupp, 2011). Whereas
researchers can accurately observe the full history of an employ-
ee’s experiences at work and maintain a record of all unfair aspects
of those experiences, this research highlights one way in which the
attention of the individual actor is more selective. As Roberson and
Stevens (2006) note, ‘‘it is difﬁcult to gauge the salience of justice
concerns when survey questions cue respondents to consider such
issues and on preselected dimensions’’ (p. 389). In this research we
asked participants to bring to mind their own examples of unjust
events and to describe these in their own words (Roberson &
Stevens, 2006). Such ‘‘event data’’ has been used to identify the
types of injustice in everyday life (Mikula, Petri, & Tanzer, 1990),
to compare self- versus other-ascribed unfair behaviors (Messick,
Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985), to uncover justice concerns
of employees moving to self-managing work-teams (Kirkman
et al., 1996), and to explore interactional concerns (Bies, 1987; Bies
& Moag, 1986). As our set of studies has shown, this approach is
well suited to investigate issues of salience and employee sensitiv-
ity to different aspects of injustice.
Theoretical implications
This research makes several contributions to theory. First, we
introduce an additional factor that can inﬂuence the importance
of different aspects of the employment relationship to the experi-
ence of injustice: temporal perspective. Similar to ‘‘accessible iden-
tity’’ (Skitka, 2003), temporal perspective can focus employee
attention on particular types of justice concerns and events.
Whether employees focus on, for example, distributive injustice
can depend on both individual differences and contextual factors
inﬂuencing temporal perspective.
Previous research has shown the effect of the objective passage
of time on justice reasoning, for example, by documenting order ef-
fects in justice judgments (Van den Bos, 2001), or postulating the
frustration effect (Folger, 1977), and the persistent injustice effect
(Davidson & Friedman, 1998). Our research shows that subjective
temporal perspective impacts justice reasoning by affecting the
salience of speciﬁc unfair events depending on the vantage point
from which they are brought to mind and evaluated.
By showing that the salience of different types of injustice can
depend on how the employment relationship is construed, this re-
search can provide insights relevant to important theoretical
frameworks in the ﬁeld of organizational justice, such as equity
theory (Adams, 1965) or the group engagement model (Blader &
Tyler, 2003). At ﬁrst sight, these models emphasize competing con-
cerns: for example, the fairness of outcome allocations versus the
fairness of procedures and interpersonal treatment. Whereas the
former is motivated by instrumental concerns, the latter is moti-
vated by concerns regarding one’s status and inclusion in a group.
Our research suggests that rather than necessarily competing, the
relative importance of these concerns may simply reﬂect whether
the same employment relationship is viewed at a higher level of
construal (in terms of more abstract, universal characteristics) or
at a lower level (in terms of more speciﬁc, concrete details relating
to the context). At any one time and depending on the perspective
of the employee, different justice events will be subject to different
levels of scrutiny and evaluation.
Our ﬁndings also suggest a plausible alternative explanation for
some previous ﬁndings in the fairness literature. We brieﬂy men-
tion two here. First, Ambrose and Cropanzano (2003) showed that
procedural (versus distributive) justice becomes less important
long after a fairness-related event occurs than directly preceding
or directly following the event. It was argued that more time is re-
quired to form a judgment about distributive versus procedural
fairness. An alternative explanation based on temporal perspec-
tives suggests that distributive (un)fairness (in this case, the out-
come of a tenure decision) may be more salient long after versus
directly following an event because the passage of time is likely
to increase employee focus on higher level, deﬁnitional features
of the employment relationship. In that study, the lower level, con-
textualized aspects of employment, such as having voice and
receiving adequate explanations, played a greater role when the
tenure decision event was temporally less distant.
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Second, in a study of anticipatory injustice, Kirkman and
colleagues (1996) asked employees about their fairness concerns
regarding a proposed move to self-managing work teams. Because
employee concerns about distributive injustice predominated, it
was suggested that distributive injustice was the main fairness
concern in self-managing work teams. An alternative explanation,
consistent with our research, is that the future orientation taken by
employees could have caused higher level representations of the
work relationship, which in turn resulted in greater salience of dis-
tributive justice.
Managerial implications
Our results show that when employees look to the future, rather
than to the past, they will be more concerned about distributive
injustice and less concerned about interactional justice. This can
lead to organizations overestimating the importance to employees
of workplace outcomes and underestimating the importance of fair
interpersonal treatment. Given a tendency for individuals to over-
estimate the importance of material outcomes to other people
(Heath, 1999), we thus caution managers against focusing too nar-
rowly on one type of injustice at the expense of other types. Rather,
it is important for organizations to also appreciate the importance,
especially for events in the recent past or close future, of non-dis-
tributive aspects of work.
We have argued that the high salience of distributive injustice
when employees consider future and temporally distant events re-
sults from high level construals of the employment relationship
that focus on workplace outcomes. However, the extent to which
high level representations of work focus on outcomes versus other
work-related interactions is likely to vary among contexts. The ef-
fects we discuss may be less strong in employment situations that
focus employee attention less on outcomes, such as material re-
wards, and more on workplace interactions, such as respectful
treatment of individuals.
Limitations and future research
A limitation of this research is that we did not examine whether
temporal perspective can also affect the recall and anticipation of
just events. One reason for our focus on unjust events is that justice
reasoning is more likely to be activated in response to negative cir-
cumstances (Greenberg, 2001). Further, unjust events are more
likely than just events to exert powerful effects on workplace atti-
tudes and behaviors, as people are more sensitive to negative ver-
sus positive information about their environments (Skowronski &
Carlston, 1987). Nonetheless, future research should examine ef-
fects of temporal perspective on the recall and anticipation of fair
treatment.
Second, in this research we compare recall of actual past events
with anticipation of future hypothetical events. Early research in
cognitive psychology on temporal orientation (e.g., Cottle, 1968)
emphasized a fundamental difference in how people think about
a past experienced event versus about ‘‘an unknown and incalcula-
ble future’’ (p. 141). However, more recent research in memory
processes and cognitive psychology suggests that future and past
oriented thinking can be compared in important respects. Both
share the same cognitive resources (Suddendorf & Busby, 2005;
Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007), as shown by the fact that memory
impairing states, such as amnesia or depression, can also impair
the ability to imagine what might happen in the future (Klein, Lof-
tus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Williams et al., 1996). Because recall and
anticipation rely in important respects on the same memory and
belief systems, it seems reasonable to suggest a common theoret-
ical framework for how both affect the salience of different types of
injustice.
Third, this research relied on participants bringing to mind a
variety of past or future events that they considered unjust, with-
out directing their attention to particular aspects of injustice. How-
ever, employees can often have their attention externally focused
on different aspects of justice. For example, an employee might
be asked by a colleague how well they are treated by their man-
ager, or concern about a current procedure might prompt an em-
ployee to focus on past procedural fairness. Future research
should therefore also investigate the predictive power of cued jus-
tice concerns versus spontaneously elicited justice concerns.
Fourth, it is important to note that the effects of temporal orien-
tation and temporal distance result from a psychological distance
between the organizational actor and phenomena recalled or
anticipated. Other types of psychological distance can also lead
to higher versus lower level construal of phenomena, including so-
cial distance, spatial distance, and uncertainty and hypotheticality
(Liberman, Trope, Macrae, & Sherman, 2007). The effects of other
types of psychological distance on the salience of different types
of injustice can be an interesting avenue for future research.
Conclusion
Important reactions to unfair treatment at work lie not only in
immediate evaluations, attitudes, and behaviors, but also in how
employees recall and anticipate experiences. And yet, as in many
other ﬁelds of management studies (George & Jones, 2000),
scholars have tended to examine organizational justice phenom-
ena without the use of a ‘‘time research lens’’ (Ancona, Goodman,
Lawrence, & Tushman, 2001). We show that the types of unfairness
Table 8
Descriptive statistics of dependent and control variables, as well as rates of non-response, across experimental conditions in Study 3.
Continuous variables Concrete past, N = 96 Abstract past, N = 110 Concrete future, N = 102 Abstract future, N = 116
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Organizational justice 5.30a 1.23 5.48a 1.51 5.17 1.54 5.52a 1.28
Age 45a 11 42 10 46a 11 43 11
Categorical variables Proportions
Gender (1 = M, 0 = F) .36 .34 .29 .38
Managerial position (1 = Yes, 0 = No) .38 .48a .50a .44a
Distributively unjust eventsA .18 .28b .41a .46a
Interactionally unjust events .35a .21b .26b .12
No event described .34a .41a .14 .25b
Note: Values marked with letters are signiﬁcantly higher in that condition than in the other condition(s). Values marked by the same letter are not different from each other at
5% signiﬁcance level.
A Note that unjust events are given here as proportions of total responses, including those who did not describe an unjust event.
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that loom largest for future events are often not the most impor-
tant in experience or retrospect. In doing so, this research takes
an important step toward highlighting the role of time perception,
memory, and anticipation in the experience of organizational
justice.
Acknowledgments
This research was funded by Grant PTDC/EGE-GES/098856/
2008 of the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology-
FCT with funds co-ﬁnanced by the state budget through the
program PIDDAC. The authors gratefully acknowledge comments
and helpful suggestions from Maureen Ambrose, Marshall
Schminke, Garriy Shteynberg, Michele Gelfand, Stephen Gilliland,
Howard Weiss, Editor Paul Levy and three anonymous reviewers,
and seminar participants at Maryland University, Purdue Univer-
sity, University of Central Florida and Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Special thanks to Francisca Saldanha, Hayley German and Hokuma
Karimova for excellent research assistance.
References
Adams, J. S. (1965). Inequity in social exchange. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.). Advances in
experimental social psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 267–299). New York: Academic Press.
Ambrose, M., & Cropanzano, R. (2003). A longitudinal analysis of organizational
fairness: An examination of reaction to tenure and promotion decisions. Journal
of Applied Psychology, 88, 266–275.
Ambrose, M. L., & Schminke, M. (2009). The role of overall justice judgments in
organizational justice research: A test of mediation. Journal of Applied
Psychology, 94, 491–500.
Ancona, D., Goodman, P., Lawrence, B., & Tushman, M. (2001). Time: A new research
lens. Academy of Management Review, 26, 645–663.
Anderson, R. J., & Dewhurst, S. A. (2009). Remembering the past and imagining the
future: Differences in event speciﬁcity of spontaneously generated thought.
Memory, 17, 367–373.
Bavelas, J. B. (1973). Effects of the temporal context of information. Psychological
Reports, 32, 695–698.
Bies, R. J. (1987). The predicament of injustice: The management of moral outrage.
In L. L. Cummings & B. M. Staw (Eds.). Research in organizational behavior (Vol. 9,
pp. 289–318). Greenwich, CT: JAL.
Bies, R. J. (2001). Interactional (in)justice: The sacred and the profane. In R.
Cropanzano & J. Greenberg (Eds.), Advances in organizational justice
(pp. 89–118). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Bies, R. J., & Moag, J. S. (1986). Interactional justice: Communication criteria of
fairness. In R. Lewicki, B. H. Sheppard, & M. H. Bazerman (Eds.). Research on
negotiation in organizations (Vol. 1, pp. 43–55). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Blader, S. L., & Tyler, R. (2003). A four-component model of procedural justice:
Deﬁning the meaning of a ‘‘fair’’ process. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin, 29, 747–758.
Bluedorn, A. C., & Martin, G. (2008). The time frames of entrepreneurs. Journal of
Business Venturing, 23, 1–20.
Bolger, N., & Amarel, D. (2007). Effects of social support visibility on adjustment to
stress: Experimental evidence. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 92,
458–475.
Bullock, J. G., Green, D. P., & Ha, S. E. (2010). Yes, but what’s the mechanism? (Don’t
expect an easy answer). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 98, 550–558.
Caruso, E. M. (2010). When the future feels worse than the past: A temporal
inconsistency in moral judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General,
139, 610–624.
Caruso, E. M., Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2008). A wrinkle in time: Asymmetric
valuation of past and future events. Psychological Science, 19, 796–801.
Chaves, A. P., Diemer, M. A., Blustein, D. L., Gallagher, L. A., DeVoy, J. E., Casares, M.
T., et al. (2004). Conceptions of work: The view from urban youth. Journal of
Counseling Psychology, 51, 275–286.
Coenen, L., Hedebouw, L., & Semin, G. (2006). The linguistic category model (LCM),
Manual. Free University Amsterdam.
Cohen-Charash, Y., & Spector, P. (2001). The role of justice in organizations: A meta-
analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 86, 278–321.
Colquitt, J. (2001). On the dimensionality of organizational justice: A construct
validation of a measure. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 386–400.
Colquitt, J., Wesson, M., Porter, C., Conlon, D., & Ng, K. (2001). Justice at the
millennium: A meta-analytic review of 25 years of organizational justice
research. Journal of Applied Psychology, 86, 425–445.
Conlon, D. E., Meyer, C. J., & Nowakowski, J. M. (2005). How does organizational
justice affect performance, withdrawal, and counterproductive behavior? In J.
Greenberg & J. A. Colquitt (Eds.), Handbook of organizational justice
(pp. 301–327). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000). The construction of autobiographical
memories in the self-memory system. Psychological Review, 107, 261–288.
Cottle, T. J. (1968). The location of experience: A manifest time orientation. Acta
Psychologica, 28, 129–149.
D’Argembeau, A., & Van der Linden, M. (2004). Phenomenal characteristics
associated with projecting oneself back into the past and forward into the
future: Inﬂuence of valence and temporal distance. Consciousness and Cognition,
13, 844–858.
Davidson, M., & Friedman, R. (1998). When excuses don’t work: The persistent
injustice effect among black managers. Administrative Science Quarterly, 43,
154–183.
Eyal, T., Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2008). Judging near and distant virtue and vice.
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 44, 1204–1209.
Folger, R. (1977). Distributive and procedural justice: Combined impact of ‘‘voice’’
and improvement on experienced inequity. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 35, 108–119.
Frederick, S., Loewenstein, G., & O’Donoghue, T. (2002). Time discounting and time
preference: A critical review. Journal of Economic Literature, 40, 351–401.
George, J., & Jones, G. (2000). The role of time in theory and theory building. Journal
of Management, 26, 657–684.
Greenberg, G. (2001). The seven loose can(n)ons of organizational justice. In J.
Greenberg & R. Cropanzano (Eds.), Advances in organizational justice
(pp. 245–273). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
Greene, W. H. (2011). Econometric analysis (7th ed.). Prentice Hall.
Guo, J., Rupp, D. R., Weiss, H., & Trougakos, J. (in press). Organizational justice: A
person-centric approach. In S. Gilliland, D. Steiner, & D. Skarlicki (Eds.), Research
in social issues in management (Vol. 7). Information Age Publishing.
Heath, C. (1999). On the social psychology of agency relationships: Lay theories of
motivation overemphasize extrinsic incentives. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, 78, 25–62.
Heckman, J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a speciﬁcation error. Econometrica, 47,
153–161.
Hofstede, G. (2001). Culture’s consequences. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Hollensbe, E., Khazanchi, S., & Masterson, S. (2008). How do I assess if my supervisor
and organization are fair? Identifying the rules underlying entity-based justice
perceptions. Academy of Management Journal, 51, 1099–1117.
Hu, L., & Bentler, P. M. (1999). Cutoff criteria for ﬁt indexes in covariance structure
analysis: Conventional criteria versus new alternatives. Structural Equation
Modeling, 6, 1–55.
Kahneman, D. (2000). Evaluation by moments: Past and future. In D. Kahneman & A.
Tversky (Eds.), Choices, values and frames (pp. 693–708). New York: Cambridge
University Press.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and
biases. Science, 185, 1124–1131.
Kirkman, B., Shapiro, D., Novelli, L., & Brett, J. (1996). Employee concerns regarding
self-managing work teams: A multi-dimensional justice perspective. Social
Justice Research, 9, 47–67.
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal experience:
The effects of episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient’s ability to remember
the past and imagine the future. Social Cognition, 20, 353–379.
Leventhal, G. S. (1976). The distribution of rewards and resources in groups and
organizations. In L. Berkowitz & E. Walster (Eds.). Advances in experimental
social psychology (Vol. 9, pp. 91–131). New York: Academic.
Liberman, N., Sagristano, M., & Trope, Y. (2002). The effect of temporal distance
on level of mental construal. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 38,
523–534.
Liberman, N., & Trope, Y. (2008). The psychology of transcending the here and now.
Science, 322, 1201–1205.
Liberman, N., Trope, Y., Macrae, S., & Sherman, S. (2007). The effect of level of
construal on the temporal distance of activity enactment. Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 143–149.
Liberman, N., Trope, Y., & Stephan, E. (2007). Psychological distance. In A. W.
Kruglanski & E. T. Higgins (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles
(2nd ed. New York: Guilford Press.
Lind, E. A. (2001). Fairness heuristic theory: Justice judgments as pivotal
cognitions in organizational relations. In J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano
(Eds.), Advances in organizational justice (pp. 56–88). Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Masterson, S., Lewis, K., Goldman, B., & Taylor, M. (2000). Integrating justice and
social exchange: The differing effects of fair procedures and treatment on work
relationships. Academy of Management Journal, 43, 738–748.
McGrath, J., & Tschan, F. (Eds.). (2004). Temporal matters in social psychology.
Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Messick, D., Bloom, S., Boldizar, J., & Samuelson, C. (1985). Why we are fairer than
others. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 21, 480–500.
Mikula, G., Petri, B., & Tanzer, N. (1990). What people regard as unjust: Types and
structures of everyday experiences of injustice. European Journal of Social
Psychology, 20, 133–149.
Reyna, V., & Brainerd, C. (1995). Fuzzy-trace theory: An interim synthesis. Learning
and Individual Differences, 7, 1–75.
Roberson, Q. M., & Stevens, C. K. (2006). Making sense of diversity in the workplace:
Organizational justice and language abstraction in employees’ accounts of
diversity-related incidents. Journal of Applied Psychology, 91, 379.
Robinson, M., & Clore, G. (2002a). Belief and feeling: Evidence for an accessibility
model of emotional self-report. Psychological Bulletin, 128, 934–960.
Robinson, M., & Clore, G. (2002b). Episodic and semantic knowledge in emotional
self-report: Evidence for two judgment processes. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 83, 198–215.
30 I. Cojuharenco et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 17–31
Rousseau, D. M. (1990). New hire perceptions of their own and their employer’s
obligations: A study of psychological contracts. Journal of Organizational
Behavior, 11, 389–400.
Rousseau, D. M. (2001). Schema, promise and mutuality: The building blocks of the
psychological contract. Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology, 74,
511–541.
Shapiro, D., & Kirkman, B. (2001). Anticipatory injustice: The consequences of
expecting injustice in the workplace. In J. Greenberg & R. Cropanzano (Eds.),
Advances in organizational justice (pp. 152–178). Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press.
Shipp, A. J., Edwards, J. R., & Schurer Lambert, L. (2009). Conceptualization and
measurement of temporal focus: The subjective experience of the past, present,
and future. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 110, 1–22.
Skitka, L. (2003). Of different minds: An accessible identity model of justice
reasoning. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 7, 286–297.
Skowronski, J., & Carlston, D. (1987). Social judgment and social memory: The role
of cue diagnosticity in negativity, positivity and extremity biases. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 52, 689–699.
Spencer, S. J., Zanna, M. P., & Fong, G. T. (2005). Establishing a causal chain: Why
experiments are often more effective in examining psychological process than
meditational analyses. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89, 845–851.
Spreng, R., & Levine, B. (2006). The temporal distribution of past and future
autobiographical events across the lifespan. Memory and Cognition, 34,
1644–1651.
Stone-Romero, E. F., & Rosopa, P. (2008). The relative validity of inferences about
mediation as a function of research design characteristics. Organizational
Research Methods, 11, 326–352.
Suddendorf, T., & Busby, J. (2005). Making decisions with the future in mind:
Developmental and comparative identiﬁcation of mental time travel. Learning
and Motivation, 36, 110–125.
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C. (2007). The evolution of foresight: What is mental
time travel, and is it unique to humans? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30,
299–351.
Thompson, E. R. (2007). Development and validation of an internationally reliable
short- form of the positive and negative affect schedule (PANAS). Journal of
Cross-Cultural Psychology, 38, 227–242.
Todorov, A., Goren, A., & Trope, Y. (2007). Probability as a psychological distance:
Construal and preference. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43, 473–482.
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2003). Temporal construal. Psychological Review, 110,
403–421.
Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Wakslak, C. (2007). Construal levels and psychological
distance: Effects on representation, prediction, evaluation, and behavior. Journal
of Consumer Psychology, 17, 83–95.
Van den Bos, K. (2001). Uncertainty management: The inﬂuence of uncertainty
salience on reactions to perceived procedural fairness. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology, 80, 931–941.
Wakslak, C., Trope, Y., Liberman, N., & Aloni, R. (2006). Seeing the forest when entry
is unlikely: Probability and the mental representation of events. Journal of
Experimental Psychology: General, 135, 641–653.
Weiss, H., & Rupp, D. E. (2011). Experiencing work: An essay on a person-centric
work psychology. Industrial and Organizational Psychology: Perspectives on
Science and Practice, 4, 83–97.
Williams, J. M. G., Ellis, N. C., Tyers, C., Healy, H., Rose, G., & MacLeod, A. K. (1996).
The speciﬁcity of autobiographical memory and imageability of the future.
Memory and Cognition, 24, 116–125.
Zimbardo, P., & Boyd, J. (1999). Putting time in perspective: A valid, reliable
individual differences metric. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
1271–1288.
I. Cojuharenco et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 17–31 31
